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THE POLITICS OF BUSH v. GORE
Evan Tsen Lee*
In the mid-1970s, a movement known as Critical Legal
Studies (" the Crits") burst onto the law school scene. The Crits
were leftist law professors disillusioned by the demise of the
Warren Court. Impatient for further progressive judicial action,
they upbraided mainstream legal liberals for insisting on
"principle" and adherence to the "rule of law."' The Crits
famously claimed that "all law is politics" 2-a slogan that first-
year law students, in their intellectual bewilderment, found
comforting because it made their world simple. Right-wing
judges act on the basis of their political beliefs; why shouldn't
left-wing judges? Indeed, a judge is incapable of doing anything
but acting on political beliefs, the Crits screamed. But by the
1990s, cooler heads had prevailed. Legal academics resumed
talking as if the rule of law meant something. Critical Legal
Studies had lost its momentum.
Then came Bush v. Gore3 As a piece of legal reasoning, the
decision is so thin that legal liberals, who for twenty-five years
stood against the Crits and their mantra of "all law is politics,"
have now thrown up their hands and conceded the point. Ronald
Dworkin, who has made a brilliant career out of insisting that
the Supreme Court makes America a nation of principle, wrote
that he can find no reason to think that the majority in Bush v.
Gore was doing anything other than trying to recruit
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.,
University of California at Berkeley; J.D., Yale University. I would like to thank Vik
Amar, David Faigman, Joe Grodin, Roger Park, and Frank Riebli for their comments. Duty
compels me to disclose that none of them completely agrees with what I say here.
1. See e.g. Gary Pellet, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561
(1988).
2. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 Yale L.J.
1515 (1991).
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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conservative reinforcements onto the Court.4 Bruce Ackerman,
who has long struggled against the view that law is nothing
more than politics, has concluded that the conservative justices
in the Bush v. Gore majority quite simply arranged for their own
succession. Ackerman openly fears a resurgence of the Crits: "I
fear that Bush v. Gore will provoke another great renaissance of
legal nihilism in our nation's law schools, a cynicism that will
slowly erode general confidence in the system." 6 Both Dworkin
and Ackerman virtually plead for an alternative explanation-
one that could be reconciled with their intellectual commitments
of the last quarter century-but neither can glimpse what that
explanation might be.7 In this essay, I will offer one such
alternative explanation.
The explanation I will not offer is that the justices in the
majority sincerely believed what they wrote. After reflection, I
agree with Dworkin, Ackerman, and many others that the
decision simply does not pass the "red-face" test. In Section I, I
will explain why the majority cannot be defended on the basis of
the written opinion. In Section II, I will offer my alternative
explanation for why the Court decided as it did. In Section III, I
will assess whether the Court's action is tenable as a matter of
political morality and legal process.
4. Ronald Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election, N.Y. Rev. Books 53-54 (Jan. I1,
2001).
5. Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 12 Am. Prospect 48 (Feb. 12, 2001)
6. Id. at 48.
7. Dworkin wrote:
We should try to resist this unattractive explanation of why the five conservative
justices stopped the recount process and declared Bush the winner. It is, after all,
inherently implausible that any-let alone all--of them would stain the Court's
reputation for such a sordid reason, and respect for the Court requires that we
search for a different and more creditable explanation of their action.
Unfortunately, however, the legal case they offered for crucial aspects of their
decisions was exceptionally weak.
Dworkin, supra n. 4, at 53.
Ackerman, noting that Justice John Paul Stevens accused the majority of a blatantly
political act, wrote:
This harsh charge will be taken up in the nation's law reviews; perhaps someone
will even produce an intellectually serious defense of the Court's decision. But
at the moment, the silence of leading conservative academics is deafening. After
a careful study of the Court's opinion, I have reluctantly concluded that Stevens
is right.
Ackerman, supra n. 5, at 48.
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I. INDEFENSIBILITY OF THE
WRITTEN OPINION IN BUSH V. GORE
There are many weak points in the Court's decision, and
they are sure to be exploited in great detail elsewhere in the law
reviews. For present purposes, I wish to focus on three of them:
(1) the majority's assertion that Bush would have suffered
irreparable injury had the stay been denied; (2) the majority's
insistence that any further recount would violate Florida law;
and (3) the concurrence's failure to follow the Court's usual
practice of deferring to a state supreme court's interpretation of
state law.
A. Irreparable Injury
In his concurrence regarding the issuance of the stay,
Justice Antonin Scalia stated, "The counting of votes that are of
questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm
to petitioner, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he
claims to be the legitimacy of his election."8 In other words,
Justice Scalia believed some of the votes being counted were not
legal votes, and if Al Gore were to have appeared to pull ahead
on the basis of such non-votes, it would have sparked a political
firestorm.
There are several problems with Justice Scalia's analysis.
Let us leave to one side the fact that the Court has seldom, if
ever, embraced a concept so ethereal as "legitimacy" when
inquiring into legally cognizable interests. Recall that Justice
Scalia has insisted on "concreteness" in harms when gauging
standing to sue.9 But even assuming for the sake of argument
that "legitimacy" counts as irreparable harm, how could the
Court have possibly thought that the harm done to Bush in
denying a stay could outweigh the harm done to Gore in
granting the stay? Whatever cloud illegal recounts might have
8. 531 U.S. 1048, 1048 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. See, for example, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1990)
(citations omitted), where the Court stated:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury-in-fact"-an invasion of a
legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b)
"actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."'
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cast on Bush's legitimacy would more than likely have been
blown away by revelations of the precise illegalities in the
recounts. The antidote to falsehoods is not prior restraint, but
truth. On the other hand, had the Court ruled on the merits that
the Florida recounts were legal, the stay would have prevented
Gore from any chance at winning the election. After all, the
Court ruled that Florida law authorized no recounts after
December 12, which is exactly when the Court issued its
decision on the merits.
B. Illegality of Further Recounts
The Court held that the Florida legislature had intended to
take advantage of the December 12 deadline set forth in federal
law,' ° and, therefore, that any recounts after that date would be
unauthorized. The Court here purported to rely on the Florida
Supreme Court's interpretation of state election law.
Again, let us lay aside the most obvious criticism, which is
that the Court did not give a fig for the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of anything in this case. The critical fact here is
that the Florida Supreme Court had never passed on the precise
question of whether recounts after December 12 would violate
the spirit or letter of the Florida electoral scheme as set forth by
the legislature. If the United States Supreme Court had sincerely
been interested in the Florida Supreme Court's view of the
matter, surely it would have remanded the question to that court,
leaving plenty of time for a new recount under uniform objective
standards, should the Florida Supreme Court have found that
state law authorized such a recount after December 12. The only
reasonable conclusion is that the majority was uninterested in
the Florida Supreme Court's view of the law and simply wanted
to stop the recounts once and for all.
C. Comity and Federalism
As the Chief Justice's concurrence acknowledged, the
Court normally defers to state supreme court interpretations of
10. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
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state law.1' He explained that this was an exception because
Article II specifically grants state legislatures the power to
determine the manner in which electors are to be selected-one
of the very few places in the Constitution that gives power
directly to state legislatures. 12 His concurrence gave no other,
nor any further, explanation.
This makes little sense. As Justice Kennedy pointed out
during oral argument, the Framers could not possibly have
meant that state legislatures were completely unmoored from
state courts in determining the manner of selecting electors.
State legislatures have always used state courts as interpretive
adjuncts because, as every first-year law student knows, general
legislative pronouncements cannot apply themselves to concrete
fact situations. So the Framers had to have assumed that state
courts would routinely provide interpretations of legislative
edicts on the selection of electors, and that those interpretations
in turn would be treated as part of the whole legislative scheme.
The notion that Article II tries to keep state courts out of the
electors picture is historically improbable. The political dynamic
in 1787 would not have pitted state legislatures against state
courts; it would have pitted state legislatures against Congress.
Article II contains no mention of state courts. 3 It grants certain
powers to state legislatures, to the exclusion of Congress. It
grants certain powers to Congress, to the exclusion of the state
legislatures. It does not attempt to exclude the state courts from
anything, simply because state courts were not considered a
political threat.
There is still another historical perspective that exposes the
weakness of Justice Scalia's Article II analysis. Because general
11. Bush v. Core, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) ("In most cases, comity and respect for
federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That
practice reflects our understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive
pronouncements of the will of the States of sovereigns.").
12. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Id.
13. Id.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
legislative enactments concerning the selection of electors will
always be in need of judicial interpretation, there are only two
candidates for the job-state courts or federal courts. There can
be no doubt that the Framers would have chosen state courts as
the final arbiter of such statutes. The Framers did not even know
if the United States Supreme Court would have the power to
review the judgments of state supreme courts.14 Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee" was still decades away, and the holding was
anything but a sure proposition in 1787.6 Yet, without any
analysis, Justices Scalia and Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, simply asserted that the final judge of the state
statutes in Bush v. Gore should be the United States Supreme
Court.,7
Therefore, I must concede to Dworkin and Ackerman that
the majority in Bush v. Gore deliberately fudged the rules.
However, I deny that this necessarily means the justices
deliberately tried to arrange for their own successors, or that
they engaged in a partisan political act. I will argue that the
justices in the majority thought they were saving the Republic
from a crisis of legitimacy and widespread domestic unrest. My
argumentative tool will have to be armchair psychology rather
than doctrinal analysis, but if Dworkin, Ackerman, and other
14. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850).
15. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
16. Between 1789 and 1860, the courts of seven states denied the power of the United
States Supreme Court to decide cases on writs of error to state courts. The legislatures of
eight states formally adopted resolutions or statutes against this power of the Supreme
Court. See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the
United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. Rev.
1, 3-4 (1913).
17. At least one conservative defense of Bush v. Gore on the merits was pitifully weak.
In The Right Call, 34 Am. Spectator 50 (Feb. 2001), Cornell University Government
Professor Jeremy Rabkin argued that the decision could be explained in either of two (non-
partisan) ways. First, the conservative justices have always been hostile to affirmative
action, and Bush v. Gore was analogous to an affirmative action case because Gore lawyers
argued that failing to count the undervotes disproportionately hurt black voters. Id. at 50.
How one race-based argument could convert Bush v. Gore as a whole into an affirmative
action case is utterly beyond me, and the notion that the five members of the majority
might have seen the case that way is truly frightening. Second, Rabkin argued that the
majority's unwillingness to remand to the Florida Supreme Court for further recounts
based on a uniform objective standard merely reflects conservatives' preference for finality
in legal process. Id. at 50-51. But finality at what point? When Bush himself not once but
twice petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review of Florida Supreme Court
decisions, was he demonstrating a preference for finality in legal process?
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legal liberals are sincere in wanting to hear alternative
explanations, some indulgence is in order.
II. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR THE MAJORITY'S
CONCLUSION IN BUSH V. GORE
The first question is why anyone in his or her right mind
would believe that further recounts in Florida would have risked
a true national disaster. Not just a brief interregnum, but an
extended period during which a massive vacuum of power and
legitimacy would produce widespread civil disintegration. Such
a vacuum of power would make the nation vulnerable not only
to the domestic violence of clashing protesters, but perhaps even
to terrorist attacks by rogue foreign states.' 8 It could well cause a
crash in the stock market, which in turn would bring about a
deep recession or even depression. Everyone would agree that
any such scenario would be highly undesirable; the question is
why any reasonable person would have thought that a contrary
decision in Bush v. Gore could conceivably have led to it.
Here is where politics comes in-not in the motivation, but
in the cognition. Three of the five justices in the majority are
ideological conservatives-Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist. A fourth, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, is not so much a right-wing ideologue as
a committed Republican.'9 The ideological conservatives,
especially Scalia and Thomas, are constantly surrounded by
other ideological conservatives, from their relatives (Virginia
Thomas's Heritage Foundation ties were well-documented), to
their social companions, to their law clerks. It is well known that
O'Connor was a Republican state legislator, and that O'Connor
socializes at the Chevy Chase Country Club, whose membership
18. Of course, the justices were acting well before the events of September 11, 2001,
but the point still stands.
19. The fifth, Anthony Kennedy, is neither. Kennedy sees himself as a statesman and
the expositor of grand populist principles. It is absolutely conceivable that he truly believed
the majority's Equal Protection analysis was correct. Less clear is why he voted with the
majority on the remedy. Not being a hard-core ideologue on judicial federalism, he may
simply have thought that the Florida Supreme Court did not need to be consulted on the
question of whether the Florida Legislature would have wanted to take advantage of the
safe-harbor provision, even if it meant foregoing recounts under a uniform objective
standard.
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(like most old-line traditional golf clubs) is thick with
conservative Republicans. The point is simple: These justices
are constantly exposed to people who view the world in a certain
way. The point is not that they are philosophically conservative,
but that they tend to perceive the acts and thoughts of
Democrats, media figures, foreign leaders, institutional
investors, and members of the general public through a
particular lens.
And what is that lens like? Unfortunately, it appears to be
quite warped. Put bluntly, conservative Republicans have
become a paranoid lot in the last few years. Many of them
honestly believe that Democrats, the liberal media, the NAACP,
agents from foreign powers, and assorted other harlots are out to
steal political victories that are rightfully theirs. The paranoia
may be fed by events as far back as the Democratic
skullduggery in West Virginia and Cook County in 1960 and the
infamous Democratic recount of the Eighth Congressional
District in Indiana in 1978. But surely the paranoia has been
most powerfully driven by one William Jefferson Clinton. After
the broken promises to Republican congressional leadership, the
government shutdown debacle, Waco, Whitewater, Vince
Foster, Travelgate, and Filegate, conservatives finally thought
that Clinton's philandering and subsequent cover-up had given
them more than enough ammunition for impeachment and
conviction. Having suffered for six years, they could taste the
sweetness of a Senate conviction and Clinton's removal from
office. When Slick Willie slipped the hangman's noose,
conservatives could only conclude that the fix was in.
Of course, the radical left has long had -its own paranoid
delusions, typified by Hillary Clinton's statement blaming her
husband's problems on a "vast right-wing conspiracy." That
accusation stung conservatives precisely because they saw
hypocrisy in it. How dare Mrs. Clinton accuse conservatives of
conspiracy when liberals are so deep into it themselves? Listen
to the conservative talk show hosts. Listen to the Republican
House leaders. Read the conservative columnists. A few days
after Gore conceded, Rush Limbaugh couldn't leave well
enough alone. He devoted an entire segment of his program to
substantiate his allegation that election officials in Florida had
deliberately dimpled chads for Al Gore by stacking ballots three
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thick and then pressing with the stylus. No one called to point
out that dimpled chads were found in many counties, that some
of the dimpled chads were for Bush, or that Republican
observers saw everything that was done during the recounts. For
that matter, no one called to suggest that really crooked
Democratic election officials might have had the presence of
mind to punch the chads all the way through and put them
through the machine on the first recount. Paranoia loves
company.
This is why, in an election between two unattractive
options, conservatives felt so much more passionate than
liberals. Slightly more people voted for Al Gore nationwide, but
if intensity of preference could have been measured, Bush would
have won in a landslide. The intensity of preference for Bush
was attributable not to Bush himself, of course, but to the need
to defeat the liberal conspiracy. Bush had started the post-
convention period with a huge lead, which all but evaporated by
election day. Conservatives saw it happening again. Another
rightful victory was about to be snatched away. The hopes of
conservatives rose again when Bush appeared to have won
Florida by an eyelash, but then began the recounts.
Conservatives imagined counters manhandling ballots so that
chads would break loose. They imagined counters dimpling
chads on purpose. They imagined counters eating chads. Liberal
Democrats would stop at nothing to retain the White House.
They are all crooked. Just look at Clinton.
In fact, there is no good reason to think that the Democrats
had the fix in during the recounts. There is no reason to think
they were about to perpetrate a massive fraud on the system. It
may be true that counting the "undervotes" would have on
balance helped Gore, but so what? Without a doubt, Republicans
would have gone after the "undervotes" if the roles had been
reversed.2° Pressing to have the undervotes counted was
certainly within the ambit of normal political maneuver.
20. Conservatives point to the graceful concessions of Richard Nixon in 1960 and
Senator John Ashcroft in 2000 as evidence that Republicans do not behave the same way
after elections as Democrats. This is nonsense. In fact, Republican National Committee
officials, with the assistance of trusted Nixon aides, filed lawsuits in Illinois, New Jersey,
and Texas, challenging the results of the 1960 election. See Hendrik Hertzberg, He's Back.
Again., New Yorker 70, 70-72 (Nov. 27, 2000). Unlike Gore, Ashcroft had no argument
that the electorate was on his side. Moreover, Ashcroft needed to maintain a graceful
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The fact is that many conservative Republicans believed
that Democrats were outright cheating during the recounts and
that it was only a matter of time before that cheating put Gore
over the top. Compounding matters, the Florida Supreme
Court-well known as an activist liberal court dominated by
Democrats-seemingly stood ready to guarantee Gore limitless
bites at the apple. At oral argument, Justice O'Connor's vocal
inflections scarcely concealed her outrage and incredulity
toward the Florida Supreme Court's last ruling. It is perfectly
plausible that she and her four colleagues in the majority thought
that Democratic cheating was about to deny a rightfully elected
Republican president his office.
Those who think the justices played simple partisan politics
should conduct a thought experiment. They should put
themselves in the justices' position, given their perceptions of
the facts.2' According to these perceptions, one party is about to
defraud its partisan rival out of the presidency. What would one
think if Republican operatives had stolen ballot boxes from
predominantly Democratic precincts in broad daylight and
thrown them in the river, thus swinging the election to their
candidate? To conservatives, the Democrats were about to
perpetrate an equivalent act. And what would happen if the
Supreme Court stood idly by while all this went on? Would the
public lose faith in the integrity of the electoral process? In the
Court? Would there be an enormous vacuum of power resulting
from widespread refusal to accept the electoral outcome? Would
there be blood in the streets? Would America's national security
be threatened?
That, I believe, is how politics influenced Bush v. Gore.
The justices did not say to themselves, "I am for Bush; therefore
I shall vote for Bush." This is what the Crits would have us
believe when they urge that "all law is politics." Yet few judges
could live with that on their consciences. Instead, it was the
justices' conservative outlook on the world that made them see
fraud where in fact there was nothing more than clunky political
public image so as to enhance his chances of obtaining a major post in any Bush
Administration.
21. H.L.A. Hart referred to this perspective as the "internal point of view," and he
insisted that it was indispensable to the complete observation of a legal system. H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law 88-91 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1994).
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maneuver. It was their conservative worldview that made them
see conspiracy where, in fact, there was incompetence." And it
was their conservative socialization that allowed them to sense
that the Right was not going to take this lying down. They could
imagine a constitutional crisis preventing an orderly transfer of
power. They could imagine clashes between righteously
indignant conservatives on the one side and liberals whipped
into a frenzy by the Jesse Jacksons and Al Sharptons of the
world on the other.
And so the justices voted to terminate the recounts, against
law and logic, on the basis of a higher principle: the preservation
of the Republic and its institutions. Does that make them
heroes? Hardly. At the bar of public judgment, I have made the
equivalent of a case for mitigation on the ground of diminished
capacity. The justices allowed their cognitive capacities to be
warped by conservative paranoia. For that they deserve
criticism. Judges should do their best to avoid social contact
with political activists, and they should try to hire law clerks
irrespective of political persuasion." Given the justices' warped
perceptions of the facts surrounding the case, however, they did
not act culpably. They lashed out in the same way as someone
who honestly, but unreasonably, perceives an imminent attack
on an innocent person. Society ought to criticize the actor for
being unreasonable, but not for wanting to fend off the
perceived attacker.
Politics, then, did play a crucial role in this case. It molded
the justices' perceptions of the underlying facts. In that banal
sense, all law is politics. Judges, like everyone else, see the
world through lenses colored by political inclinations. But that is
not what people think when they hear the slogan, "All law is
politics." They think it means that judges make decisions the
same way that politicians make them-by consciously
22. For example, conservatives saw the Florida Supreme Court as openly disobeying
the United States Supreme Court when it ordered 168 votes counted. Those votes had been
vacated by the Supreme Court's first opinion. Only a mind bent on conspiracy could see
that as anything other than an oversight born of haste. Why would the Florida Supreme
Court choose to declare war on the United States Supreme Court over 168 votes? If the
Florida court had made a conscious decision to disobey, wouldn't it have simply reaffirmed
its earlier opinion?
23. I have no doubt that some liberal justices have violated this injunction over the
years as well, but two wrongs do not make a right.
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manipulating the facts and the policy considerations to reach a
result that toes the party line. Yet, if I am right, the majority in
Bush v. Gore did not simply manipulate the facts or doctrine to
serve the Republican Party's best interests. The justices invoked
a higher principle to trump the rules in this unusual case where
they honestly perceived a genuine threat to the nation.
That is my response, not only to the Crits, but to Dworkin
and Ackerman. If they sincerely want some explanation other
than partisan politics, here it is. We may never know which
explanation is closer to the truth, but I submit that my
explanation is at least plausible. I agree with Dworkin when he
says our respect for the Court and for principled decision
requires that we search diligently for an explanation other than
partisanship. I would go beyond that to say we should prefer the
most creditable explanation that is plausible.
III. THE TENABILITY OF THE MAJORITY'S
CONCLUSION FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF POLITICAL MORALITY AND LEGAL PROCESS
I could stop at this point, having fully proffered my
alternative scenario. But it would be unsatisfying not to confront
the major questions raised by my explanation: Is it proper and
desirable to invoke the principle of "saving the Republic" to
justify departure from established doctrine? Should a court ever
"fudge" on the law, even to achieve some universally valued
objective? Isn't such a decision "result-oriented" and therefore
no different from partisan politics?
These are huge jurisprudential questions deserving fuller
treatment elsewhere, but I will outline an answer here. Courts
must, on rare occasion, depart from the rules.24 In a case where it
is widely agreed that massive injustice would result from
following the rules, a refusal to depart would border on rule-
fetishism. Imagine a judge being presented with an ex parte
petition from the government for permission to torture someone.
This person is the only one with information about a terrorist
who is about to poison the water system of some large
24. Cf. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 179 (Harvard 1982)
("The Supreme Court must occasionally lie; the courts by and large should not.").
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metropolitan area-the authorities do not know which one. The
judge is convinced that if he or she does not permit the torture,
millions of people will die in a matter of hours. Torture is, of
course, always strictly prohibited by law. With heavy heart, this
judge should and will grant the petition.
It might be argued that an exception for this type of case
should be written into the rules. "Do not torture unless
absolutely necessary to save many innocent lives," the rule
might state. In the case of Bush v. Gore, the rule might say,
"Always defer to state supreme court interpretations of state law
unless the future of the Republic is greatly imperiled." The
problem is that, in the common law system of adjudication, rules
develop their own gravitational fields. The courts quite likely
will end up with a larger set of exceptions than we want. If we
leave them out of the rules, individual judges will invoke the
exceptions silently when they feel they must, but the absence of
any public justificatory statement and the absence of any formal
imprimatur will minimize any future gravitational field.2" Of
course, commentators like myself will be on record as approving
the exceptions, but academic scholarship cannot develop a
gravitational field when unaccompanied by any open
acknowledgment or imprimatur from courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The day after Al Gore conceded, the noted liberal
constitutional scholar Bert Neuborne appeared on a morning talk
show. He was asked what he thought of Bush v. Gore. He said
he disagreed with it, but before he could explain why, he had to
draw an important distinction. It was fair to criticize the
decision, Neuborne said, but not fair to criticize the justices
personally. They had done their best under the circumstances, he
said. I stand with Professor Neuborne. The justices would do
well to socialize with people other than right-wing cranks, but
we would be wrong to impugn their integrity as judges. And,
although Bush v. Gore pointedly reminds us that politics
25. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of
Rights, 222 Harper's Mag. 63 (Feb. 1961).
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influences adjudication, law and politics are not one and the
same.
